This paper examines the impact of a change in the German child benefit system in 1996, which led to a large increase in lump sum transfers to families with children. We analyze the impact on the labor force participation of women. Comparing behavioral changes of women with children with behavioral changes of women without children, we find that mothers with a working partner and children above age six considerably reduced the number of working hours (conditional on participation). Participation rates however did not decrease.
Introduction
In many European and other developed countries governments distribute important shares of public transfers to families with children, some of them directly targeted at supporting child rearing. In Germany a large part of these child related transfers is distributed through child benefits (Kindergeld) which are monthly lump sum transfers to parents. In the year 2006 expenditures for child benefits sum to around 30 billion Euros per year which is equal to 0.9 percent of GDP. Many policy makers argue that child benefits are an important tool to promote equity and to reduce poverty, especially child poverty. Recently a discussion on increasing child benefits was motivated by the increase in child poverty rates observed during the last couple of years (Corak et al. 2008 ) and the alleged potential to combat poverty by means of transfers. Yet, for Germany only few studies evaluate the impact of child related transfers on family behavior and child outcomes. 1 We take this as a starting point to analyze the impact of child benefits on labor market participation of parents. The focus on labor market participation is due to evidence that parental non-participation in the labor market is the main reason for child poverty (Fer-tig/Tamm 2010) . Furthermore, simple models of consumer behavior predict that lump sum income transfers lead to a reduction in labor market participation and the number of working hours (e. g. Pencavel 1986 ) and might thus lead to an increase in poverty. In fact various studies based on German data provide evidence of negative income elasticities, especially for married women.
2 Most of this evidence, however, is based on cross-sectional differences in labor market participation between individuals with different levels of non-labor incomes or earnings of the partner. In contrast to this, the following analysis is based on exogenous changes in income induced by a policy reform.
In order to identify any impact on labor market participation there has to be a significant variation in policy over time, space or by recipient. Such variation is provided by the reform of the system of child benefit transfers which was implemented in 1996/1997. The reform led to large increases in transfer payments directed to families with children. We attempt to estimate the impact of transfers by comparing changes in outcomes of individuals affected by the reform (i. e. those with children) with changes in outcomes of individuals not affected by the reform (i. e. those without children). In the analysis we will mainly focus on the impact on women with working partner and youngest child above age six.
We begin by presenting the reform and the institutional background in Section 2. Section 3 presents the data and identification strategy. Main results as well as sensitivity checks are provided in Section 4. The final section provides conclusions.
Institutional background
Child benefit payments have a long tradition in West Germany existing since the 1950s. The system underwent several reforms since being introduced, mainly extending coverage to larger shares of the population. During the 1990s, the period we are focusing on, eligibility for child benefit was only pegged to the age of the child and his/her participation within the educational system. For children up to age 17 all parents were eligible. For children aged 18 to 26 parents were eligible if children were participating in the educational system (e. g. school, college, university, apprenticeship) and if the personal income of the child (e. g. through part time jobs) did not exceed 6135 Euro per year. Besides these age regulations eligibility for the benefit was not based on labor market participation of parents, family income or any other form of means test. In addition, eligibility was not restricted to children living within the household of the parents, thus parents received benefits even if children left home, e. g. in order to study elsewhere.
Child benefit payments depend on the number of eligible children. In 1995, i. e. under the old system, monthly payments for the first child were equal to 36 Euro, 66 Euro for the second, 112 Euro for the third and 123 Euro for the fourth and each further child.
3 In 1996 payments were increased to 102 Euro for the first and for the second child, to 153 Euro for the third and to 179 Euro for each further child. In 1997 payments for the first and second child were increased further to 112 Euro. This change in child benefits led to 2 Franz (1985) finds sizable effects of husband's earnings on women's participation rates and on working hours using Microcensus data. Wagenhals (2000) reports income elasticities of hours of work of around -0.20 using GSOEP data from 1984 to 1996 which is close to findings in Franz (1985) .
a permanent increase in household income by a considerable amount and is much larger than any changes experienced after. The reform was due to an intervention of the federal constitutional court which decided in September 1992 that child benefits were too low. The change of the child benefit or at least the size of the increase was unanticipated by most households, because the German parliament did not decide on the changes before September 1995.
In addition to these changes in benefit payments, which were most visible to the public, various other aspects related to the benefit payments changed as well, making comparisons between 1995 and 1996/1997 more complicated. Besides lump sum child benefit payments there was an increase in the tax exemption for children from 2098 Euro per year in 1995 to 3203 Euro in 1996 and further to 3534 Euro in 1997. While up to 1995 parents received the child benefit and the tax exemption, after the reform they were receiving one of them only.
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This implies that the net impact of the reform on household income depends on the parents' marginal tax rate (that depends on the income of both partners because generally married couples file joint tax declarations). Comparisons are complicated further, as those parents who did not fully benefit from the tax exemption for children, i. e. low income households, received supplemental child benefit transfers of up to 33 Euro per child per month and high income households experienced reductions in child benefit payments until 1995. A summary of the regulations before and after the reform is provided in Table 1 . 4 In practice all parents received a monthly payment equal to the child benefit. After handing in the tax declaration at the end of year the tax authority decided whether the tax exemption was more favorable to parents. Only if the tax exemption was more favorable they applied the exemption and offset the tax returns with the benefit payments already paid out. This latter was the case for only 5 % of the households. Table 2 displays how the entire reform of the child benefit system affected net income of various types of households distinguishing by number of children and level of income. Overall, it becomes clear that households at the lower end of the income distribution and households with more children experienced larger absolute increases in net income than households with few children or households at the upper end of the income distribution. Having said this, the increase per child is larger for families with few children. In order to judge the size of the increase a comparison with median incomes of families is helpful. The median monthly net income of two adult families with children was around 2000 Euro in 1995. The median single parent family had slightly less than 1100 Euro per month.
The work incentives of the child benefit and the tax exemption for children pre and post reform become visible from Figure 1 which draws the overall annual transfer against household income for the case of a single parent family with one child. While until 1995 the transfer was slightly increasing with income (due to the tax exemption and the progressive tax system) and thus generating an incentive to work, the transfer was basically flat over most of the income scale from 1996 on. Thus, the reform removed the positive work incentive. Additionally the reform led to an increase in benefits. From a theoretical perspective this income effect should also lead to a decrease of work incentives.
Data and identification strategy
In the empirical analysis, we use data from the German Microcensus (MZ). The MZ is a repeated cross-section covering a representative sample of 1 percent of all households in Germany, which are about 390,000 households/830,000 individuals each year. Our analysis is based on the scientific use-file which contains 70 percent of the 1 percent sample. The MZ is part of the European Labour Force Survey and focuses on employment and labor market outcomes. The survey also covers detailed information on household com- position and sociodemographics. We have access to data from 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1998, i . e. to two points in time before the reform and to two points in time after. In each of the years interviews took place during the last week of April.
This paper analyzes the labor market participation of adults with children and concentrates on mothers with a working partner (secondary earner model). These women are the treatment group as they are the ones benefiting from the reform in 1996/1997. We focus on mothers with working partners as the labor market participation of this group has been shown to be highly responsive to financial incentives (e. g. Killingsworth 1983 ).
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We rely on changes over time to identify the response of the treatment group, i. e. mothers with a working partner, towards the reform. Since there may be other policy or economic shocks and underlying time trends in labor market participation we use a control group to isolate the impact of the child benefit reform on behavior from other factors. The control group includes women with a working partner who are not living together with children.
Similar difference-in-differences strategies comparing individuals with and without children have been used, for example, in Eissa (1995) , Blundell et al. (1998) , Eissa and Hoynes (2004) , Blundell et al. (2005) and Hotz et al. (2006) . The underlying assumption of this identification strategy is that there be no contemporaneous shocks to the relative labor market outcomes of the treatment group. While this assumption is very strong, especially as the average characteristics of individuals in the treatment and control group might differ, it becomes more reasonable once we condition on observable characteristics. Still, if there were any specific shocks to the labor demand for parents then these changes would incorrectly be attributed to the child benefit reform.
In order to mitigate any such problems we exclude from the analysis households living in East Germany, households with children below age 7 and multi-generation households (i. e. families where children, parents and grandparents are living together in one household). The first group is left out of the analysis because the East German labor market had been plagued by the consequences of transition from a planned economy to a market economy during that time. The second group is excluded as the labor market attachment of mothers with young children is highly restricted by access to child care facilities. We are not able to rule out changes in supply during that period. Furthermore there have been various changes in parental leave regulations at the beginning of the 1990s which might have changed participation rates of this group (Schö nberg/Ludsteck 2007, Merz 2005) . The third group is left out because households with more than two adults might differ in behavior, e. g. grandparents might be household heads and contribute most to household income. In addition we restrict the sample to individuals aged 20 to 55 and leave out individuals from the control group who are below age 27 if they are within the educational system. The latter might indirectly benefit from the child benefit reform, as they might be eligible children and their parents (living in a separate household) might directly pass on benefits to them.
The outcome variables of interest are the employment status of the individual and the number of working hours of employed individuals. 6 About working hours the MZ provides information on contracted hours and on actual hours during the week of survey. For the analysis both are used as outcomes. The participation decision is estimated using a probit model, the hours equation is based on OLS for the subgroup of individuals actually participating. 7 In the empirical analysis we control for several important determinants of labor market participation. We include indicator variables for the number of children (one, two, three or more), indicators for the educational attainment of the individual and her age, an indicator for foreigners and indicators for the size of the community. Furthermore we control for the general economic situation by including the unemployment rate on the regional level (we use rates for women measured on the level of federal states) and for the income of the partner (by including indicators for less than 1250 Euro, 1250-1750 Euro, 1750-2250 Euro, more than 2250 Euro per month and 6 We define those individuals as being employed who report a positive number of actual working hours during the week of survey instead of relying on the employment status directly provided in the MZ. This is due to changes in the official definition of employment used in the data which for example defines women taking maternity leave as being employed in some years, in others not. A similar strategy (i. e. to rely on positive working hours) has been followed e. g. in Geisler and Kreyenfeld (2005) . 7 The use of a two-part model for the hours equation instead of a Heckman selection model is due to lack of exclusion restrictions. As Puhani (2000) summarizes, these models are more robust than selection models without exclusion restriction if the inverse Mills' ratio is highly collinear with the other controls. R 2 of the regression of the inverse Mills' ratio against the other controls is above 0.984 and the condition number exceeds 55 in all of our cases. In addition, we are interested in actual working hours instead of potential hours, which the selection model focuses on. Having said this, none of the results hinges on the actual choice of model. In our case, results of a Heckman selection model are very similar to those of the two-part model. earnings partner missing). We also generate an indicator variable equal to one for all years after the reform. An interaction term of this post-reform dummy with an indicator for living together with children provides the difference-in-differences estimate. For the treatment and the control group descriptive statistics of the variables are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. Mothers with working partner, for example, are on average 41 years old, almost two thirds have an intermediate education and 14 % have a higher education. Every second mother with working partner has one child, 39 % have two children and 8 % have more than two children. 9 % of these mothers have a foreign nationality. Within groups the background characteristics hardly change between years. Differences between groups are somewhat larger.
Labor market participation
In this section we present the results comparing outcomes of the treatment and the comparison group in 1997 with outcomes in 1995. After presenting the main results we provide results based on alternative identification strategies and analyze whether treatment effects are heterogeneous between specific groups.
Difference-in-differences analysis
The results displayed in Table 3 compare outcomes of women with working partner with or without children in 1995 and 1997. They show that children are important determinants of labor market participation, even though we excluded all households with children below age seven. The employment probability is lower by 8 percentage points among women with one child compared to women without children. Among mothers with two children it is lower by 15 percentage points and lower by 25 percentage points among mothers with three or more children. The level of education is important for employment as well. Most of the other covariates are significant and generally have the excepted sign. The impact of individual characteristics on the number of working hours conditional on employment is similar in structure as on employment probabilities. The DID estimate indicates that employment rates have been almost unchanged after the reform while working hours were falling by around 1.1 hour per week conditional on being employed. This suggests that the increase in child benefit transfers (together with other contemporaneous reforms or shocks) did not significantly affect participation of women with working partner at the extensive margin. There is however a significant decrease at the intensive margin.
Alternative identification assumption
As pointed out in Section 3 these results depend on the identifying assumption that relative labor market outcomes of treatment and comparison group would have experienced similar changes without the reform. While this assumption is not testable, comparisons with changes between years not affected by reforms specific to parents or nonparents might increase the credibility of the assumption. Therefore a placebo test is provided in Table 4 . Here we compare changes in labor market outcomes between 1993 and 1995, which is a period were (to our knowledge) no child specific reforms took place. The first two columns of the table repeat the baseline DID estimates for the period 1995 to 1997 already presented before (cf. Table 3 ). Columns three and four present the estimates for a change between 1993 and 1995. Finally, columns five and six present results assuming that any relative trends observed between 1993 and 1995 were stable afterwards and where the DID estimates for a change between 1995 and 1997 represent deviations from this trend. This latter specification assumes that there is a time-invariant trend differing between treatment and control group. Clearly, this time-invariant trend assumption is very strong as well. For women with working partner the comparison between 1993 and 1995 indicates that during this period no significant change occurred between parents and non-parents. Consequently, under the time-invariant trend assumption the DID estimates (for a change between 1995 and 1997) is very similar to the baseline DID estimate. That is, mothers with working partner display a reduction in working hours.
Heterogeneity in response and robustness checks
In order to allow for heterogeneity in response towards the reform we now compare groups of women who are more similar in terms of observable characteristics than the groups compared thus far. Results presented in subsection 4.1 indicate that the level of education is an important determinant of employment. Various studies have shown that during the 1990s the impact of technological change led to increasing differences between educational Kluve et al. (2006) provide evidence that labor force dynamics induced by swings of the business cycle differ between educational groups, though, to smaller extend for West German women than for men. In order to allow for different changes over time between educational groups we compare outcomes between treatment and control groups separately by level of education. Table A2 in the Appendix indicates that mothers with intermediate education show the largest changes compared to childless women. For them, working hours significantly decreased by around -1.3. Changes among women with low and with high education are insignificant (working hours decrease by -0.9 and -0.4 respectively). This is weak evidence that DID estimates differ somewhat by level of education.
Since education is highly correlated with income the heterogeneity between educational groups might reflect differences in response due to differences in the increase in benefit transfers. As shown in Section 2 the overall change in transfer payments differed by level of income, generally being larger for low income households. An alternative reason for potential heterogeneity by level of income might be a reform of the income tax system that took place parallel to the child benefit reform in 1996. The reform increased individual tax exemptions as well as marginal tax rates at the lower end of the income distribution. While in principle the change of the tax system was equal for households with or without children, the response to the tax reform might differ. This might be the case, if the proportion of individuals at the lower end of the income distribution differs between households with children and households without. To directly test for heterogeneity with regards to income we split the sample by level of earnings of the partner. We find that Note: Marginal effects printed in italics indicate statistical significance at 10 %-level, and Marginal effects printed in boldface indicate statistical significance at 5 %-level. Regression also includes information on number of children, age, level of education, nationality, size of the community, regional unemployment rate and earnings of the partner. Sample is restricted to West Germany and households without children below age 7.
results hardly differ between women with low earnings partner and those with high earnings partner (Table A3 in the Appendix).
In another specification we allow the impact of the child benefit reform to differ by number of children. As presented in Section 2 the change in benefit transfers differed by number of children and thus might lead to different responses. In this case, heterogeneity is accounted for in the regressions by including interaction terms between the DID dummy and indicators for whether there is one or more than one child in the household. While the point estimates of the DID interaction terms are generally somewhat larger for women with two or more children than for women with one child (Table A4 in the Appendix), none of the differences between DID interaction terms is statistically significant at any reasonable level. That is, there is no clear indication of heterogeneity in response by number of children. Finally, we did several robustness checks. Firstly we excluded from our sample individuals aged 25 and below, as it is very unlikely that these individuals have children age 7 and above and therefore are unlikely to enter the treatment group. Excluding these individuals does not change the results at all. Secondly we use data from 1998 (instead of 1997) and compare outcomes with 1995. The rational is that parents might need some time to change behavior in response to the reform. There are small changes in the estimated coefficients but sign and significance of the estimates do not change, i. e. results are very similar overall.
Conclusions
The paper shows that children are important determinants of labor market participation of women at the intensive and the extensive margin. Women with children generally show lower participation rates and fewer working hours than women without children.
Comparing changes in these outcomes between 1995 and 1997 we find a considerable decrease in working hours by around one hour per week of mothers with working partner and youngest child above age six relative to comparable women without children. We also find that this result is fairly robust, i. e. alternative identification assumptions do not challenge the findings. In addition, we find slight evidence on heterogeneity in response to treatment with mothers with intermediate education displaying somewhat larger relative decreases in working hours than mothers with low or high education. Overall this picture is in line with a negative income elasticity of women with working partner who have children at school age. The average decrease by one hour is equal to 3.4 percent of working time of mothers with a working partner. Multiplied with median earnings of this group of women which are around 750 Euro per month the expected income reduction for an average individual of the group is close to 300 Euro per year. This would imply that a very large part of the increase in child benefits is set off by a partial withdrawal from work. Having said this, it is not entirely clear, whether the observed withdrawal is exclusively caused by the child benefit reform or represents a combined effect of the transfer increase and other contemporaneous reforms or differences in adapting to, for example, fluctuations in the business cycle. Overall, we conclude that the reform was welfare increasing for all adults with children, since either their transfer income increased or because mothers deliberately decided to increase utility by re-allocating time from work to unpaid activities. The change in maternal working behavior implies, however, that the lump sum transfer did not unfold its full potential to increase financial well-being of a large group of children. Topics for future research are to analyze whether the reduction in working time of mothers with working partner and children at school age is mirrored in an increase in time devoted to children and thus possibly adding to child well-being by other means. In addition, one might analyze changes in consumption patterns of households not withdrawing from work, in order to determine whether and how the additional income is spent on children.
Finally some words on single parents. Single mothers and single fathers also experienced the increase in child benefits and constitute groups of high relevance from a political perspective, especially because the prevalence of poverty is very high among these households and transfers play an important role in household budgets. The present article does not contain any results for single mothers and single fathers because findings were not conclusive. For single mothers the comparison group (single women without children) does not appear appropriate. For single fathers the number of observations in the data is rather small. Readers interested in details on single parents will find them in the working paper version of this article (Tamm 2009 ). Note: Marginal effects printed in italics indicate statistical significance at 10 %-level, and Marginal effects printed in boldface indicate statistical significance at 5 %-level. Regression also includes information on number of children, age, level of education, nationality, size of the community, regional unemployment rate and earnings of the partner. Sample is restricted to West Germany and households without children below age 7. Low earnings partner defined as up to 1500 Euro per month; high earnings partner defined as more than 1500 Euro per month. Observations with missing information on earnings of the partner are neither included in high nor in low income sample. Note: Marginal effects printed in italics indicate statistical significance at 10 %-level, and Marginal effects printed in boldface indicate statistical significance at 5 %-level. Regression also includes information on number of children, age, level of education, nationality, size of the community, regional unemployment rate and earnings of the partner. Sample is restricted to West Germany and households without children below age 7.
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